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Since the summer of 1997, the East Asian "tiger" nations have suffered an 
unprecedented bout of weakness, plunging what had been vigorously expanding 
economies into a deep crisis. A number of domestic economic problems joined 
forces with turbulence on the foreign exchanges to generate a crisis of confidence 
on a grand scale. The crisis was triggered off by fundamental imbalances, with a 
key role being played by the "moral hazard" effect: domestic enterprises had been 
backed by impficit state guarantees, and it was always assumed that the IMF would 
assist if necessa~ Then a destabilizing wave of speculation ran through the financial 
markets, pushing even countries with sound economic structures into difficulties. 
This article highlights the sequence of developments in the East Asian crisis, 
oroviding an economic explanation of the phenomenon. 
T he South-East Asian countries of Thailand, Malay- sia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines had 
been enjoying a veritable economic upsurge for over 
ten years, with high real rates of growth (see Figure 1). 
The foundations for the East Asian economic miracle 
had been laid by low wages, by highly motivated 
people, and by liberal economic policies which also 
opened up domestic financial and capital markets to 
foreign investors. 
For many years Thailand, with its liberal legal 
environment for investors and its idea of making the 
exporting sector the engine of economic develop- 
ment, was widely regarded as a model for other 
developing countries to follow. In the light of an 
impressive export performance and high rates of 
growth, an ever-increasing inflow of foreign capital 
came into Bangkok once its financial markets had 
been deregulated in the early 1990s. That inflow of 
funds was further spurred on both by relatively high 
interest rates and the pegging of the Thai baht to the 
US dollar, allowing the currency to be judged as 
stable. However, these substantial volumes of capital 
imports were increasingly made up not so much of the 
long-term funds used to invest in real capital as of 
short-term portfolio investment which responds 
sensitively to new information. 
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The major inflow of foreign exchange led to pro- 
nounced domestic credit expansion, some of which 
ended up in the property sector. Financial institutions 
that lend long while doing a lot of their borrowing on a 
short-term basis are liable to run into liquidity pro- 
blems if their creditors start to pull out their money 
due to distrust.' There were more than 90 finance 
companies operating in Thailand, more than half of 
which have now had to be liquidated. These com- 
panies, which had been inadequately supervised by 
government authorities, had been particularly care- 
less in their lending to the property sector. 
Similarly, a large amount of borrowing went into 
funding private consumption, with not enough 
financial resources going into capital investment to 
enhance productivity. Thailand's balance of payments 
soon showed a drastic increase in the current account 
deficit, as stagnating exports were outweighed by a 
high level of imports and by the interest payments on 
foreign debt (see Figure 2). Recessionary tendencies 
and slack growth in many of the main industrial 
' The function of financial intermediaries is to provide long-term 
credit even if their debt consists mainly of short-term deposits. 
According to the central limit theorem the liquidity risk can be sub- 
stantially reduced by pooling. That is why banks will hold a small 
percentage in cash under normal circumstances. The risk of bank 
runs, however, cannot be excluded. Even solvent financial inter- 
mediaries may be involved in a self-fulfilling panic. Deposit insurance 
will help to prevent sudden deposit withdrawals but may lead to 
moral hazard of the intermediary. 
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Figure 1 
Rates of real GDP Growth in East Asian 
Countries, 1991-1996 
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Figure 2 
Current Account Balances in East Asian 
Countries, as a proportion of GDP, 1990-1996 
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countries (especially Japan and European countries) 
damped down the demand for export goods. At the 
same time, rising wage levels in Thailand led to 
intensified competition with low-wage countries such 
as the People's Republic of China and Vietnam. 
Thailand's exports chiefly include textile products, 
electronic articles and computer components. 
The serious financial crisis in Thailand which began 
in the property sector reached a peak in spring 1997, 
quickly spreading to the rest of the economy. Massive 
speculation against the Thai baht was met at first by 
a major support drive mounted by the Bank of 
Thailand, which injected more than $ 4 billion into the 
market during May in a bid to stave off the attacks 
being mounted by hedge funds and other market 
players. The "de facto" peg to the US dollar finally had 
to be abandoned on 2nd July 1997, and the baht 
immediately depreciated by 17% against the dollar. 2 
Thailand's crisis had its roots at home. The rapid 
increase in foreign debt, which had reached $ 90 
billion by July 1997, growing lending to the property 
sector, the use of borrowing to finance consumer 
spending while productive investment in industry was 
neglected, coupled with the intensified competition 
from low-wage producers and a falling demand for 
export products all fuelled the current account deficit. 
The speculation against the baht on the foreign 
exchanges was thus based on fundamentals and did 
not, in the first instance, amount to speculation of a 
destabilizing nature? Other aspects which need to be 
borne in mind when judging this crisis are the 
numerous changes taking place among the country's 
political leadership and the widespread incidence of 
corruption. 
Thailand's Crisis Spreading 
around South-East Asia 
The Thailand crisis quickly spread to other South- 
East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Philippines, all of whose currencies came under 
pressure and fell sharply in value. Like Thailand, these 
countries were all running high current account 
deficits, had high levels of foreign debt and were the 
scene of unhealthy speculation in construction 
projects and real estate (see Figure 2). 
In the period from July to the end of October 1997, 
the South-East Asian currencies were all devalued 
more and more against the US dollar, with the Thai 
baht (-34%) and Indonesian rupiah (-45%) leading the 
fall, followed by the Malaysian ringgit (-26%) and 
Philippine peso (-25%) (see Figure 3)? 
The currencies have continued to depreciate, and 
there is no floor to this trend in sight at the time of 
writing. While the main initial pressure on the South- 
East Asian currencies came from speculators and 
from domestic economic actors seeking to hedge 
2 The baht had been pegged to a basket of currencies dominated by 
the US dollar, though the Bank of Thailand did permit a certain 
amount of deviation from the currency's "parity". 
3 Destabil izing speculation may develop as a result of incomplete 
information and irrational behaviour by market participants. This kind 
of speculation increases price volatility and is detrimental to the 
market's efficiency. 
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their dollar-denominated ebts, as time has gone on 
more long-term factors have played a part in the 
continued depreciation. In addition to increased credit 
risk, these include the increasing risk of inflation and 
the fear that restrictive monetary policies would not 
be able to stabilize the currencies quickly enough to 
make up for the loss of confidence in them. The 
speculative attacks launched against the South-East 
Asian currencies were subsequently amplified by 
irrational market behaviour (the domino effect, or the 
herd instinct), when attention ceased to be paid to the 
differing underlying structures and fundamental 
variables in the countries concerned. 
Nevertheless, the Singapore dollar only depre- 
ciated by about 10% vis-&-vis the US dollar in the 
period cited, and the Hong Kong dollar has kept to its 
US-dollar peg (see Figure 3). 
In the normal course of events, when a country's 
currency depreciates this has a positive impact on its 
competitiveness provided that its firms are not heavily 
dependent on imported inputs to produce domestic 
goods. The MarshalI-Lerner criterion, stating when a 
country's trade balance will improve following 
devaluation, is not normally met in the short term due 
to the J-curve effect? This can also be exacerbated 
by a fall-off in foreign demand for the country's goods 
and services in anticipation of a further devaluation of 
its currency. However, when cumulative devaluations 
occur in a number of currencies, the impact on inter- 
national trade can be very damaging, as the "beggar- 
my-neighbour" policies of the 1930s showed. 
The main question now is whether the devaluation 
of East Asian currencies will persist, and if so, whether 
any other countries may be forced to adjust their 
exchange rates. The possibility of a wave of neo- 
protectionism cannot be ruled out. 
' These currencies' pegs to a basket of currencies were abandoned 
in the following sequence: 2nd July for the Thai baht, 1 lth July for the 
Philippine peso, 18th July for the Malaysian ringgit, and 21st July for 
the Indonesian rupiah. 
The "J-curve effect" refers to the short-term deterioration in the 
trade balance following a devaluation as a result of continuing flows 
of goods with relatively low price elasticities. 
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Figure 3 
Dollar Exchange Rates of East Asian Currencies 
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In contrast to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore operate 
primarily as service economies. Hence the deva- 
luation of the former countries' currencies does not 
have a great deal of influence on Hong Kong's and 
Singapore's current accounts. 
The Hong Kong Crash 
In Hong Kong, too, considerable capital inflows 
from abroad generated an increase in the domestic 
credit base and pushed interest rates down. Apart 
from infrastructure improvements, the foreign funds 
were also used to finance private consumption and, to 
a considerable degree, real estate and related 
construction. These trends fuelled speculation, and 
property prices soared, putting on 50% in the space 
of the previous two years. Given that the banking 
system had plenty of liquidity, that real property was 
considered a secure investment, and also given some 
strong personal connections and corruption in this 
sector, the credit risk thus accumulated had been 
ignored. On top of that, there was an increased 
willingness to enter into risky ventures due to the 
"moral hazard" effect, because firms thought that they 
were to be bailed out by the government in case of 
failure. 
Singapore, by contrast, had recognized the risk of 
a property crisis and taken a number of measures in 
1996, following which prices came down. 
The excesses in the property market, feelings of 
insecurity following Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese 
sovereignty, the South-East Asian currency crisis, and 
the sheer heights the stock market had reached since 
1995, all conspired to produce the Hong Kong crash 
last autumn. ~ 
On Thursday, 23rd October 1997, the Hong Kong 
stock exchange's Hang Seng index fell by 10.41%. 
Though the index did recover by 6.9% the following 
day, the loss over the week as a whole nevertheless 
came to 16%, by which time the Hang Seng was 33% 
down on its all-time high of 7th August 1997. The 
crash in Hong Kong sent shock-waves to other 
financial centres, with falls of varying sizes occurring 
The Hong Kong crash was chiefly triggered off by negative infor- 
mation, in contrast to the 1987 crash which had purely speculative 
origins; on this, see G. Asch inger :  BSrsenkrach und Spekulation 
-eine 6konomische Analyse, Munich 1995. 
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Figure 4 
Share Indices of East Asian Countries 
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across Europe (DAX -4.7%; FTSE-100 -3.1%; CAC- 
40 -3.2%), yet slightly smaller ones in the USA, where 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 2.4%, and 
Japan, where the Nikkei index fell 3%. 
On Tuesday, 28th October when the Hang Seng 
dropped by 13.7%, the Hong Kong stock exchange 
suffered another violent fluctuation, but with an even 
greater upward one the following day (+19%). Also on 
28th October, the Dow Jones was up 4.7%, bringing 
the decline on the NYSE to a halt. Since the week 
beginning on 20th October (ten years after the 1987 
crash), stock markets have tended to be increasingly 
volatile, as manifested by such factors as a sharp 
increase in traded volumes. Figure 4 shows the day- 
by-day movements in the share indices of East Asian 
stock markets from October 1997 onwards. 
Although it was the emergence of negative 
information (showing altered fundamental variables) 
which triggered off the Hong Kong crash, the financial 
markets had been prone to destabilizing speculation 
for some time, and this may well have amplified the 
collapse of the Hang Seng index. 
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The Hong Kong Dollar's Peg to the US Dollar 
The fact that the Hong Kong dollar is the only East 
Asian currency which has held on to its US$ peg 
increases the exposure to speculative attacks, even 
though Hong Kong has currency reserves of about US 
$ 80 billion available to defend the US-dollar parity, 
and China's central bank would be willing to supply 
further reserves to support the Hong Kong currency if 
necessary. 7 Hong Kong operates a currency-board 
system which guarantees 100% backing for the Hong 
Kong dollar in terms of US dollars. The South-East 
Asian economies had also held their currencies 
pegged to the US dollar before they were left to float, 
but in practice they had sometimes deviated from 
their dollar parities, quite apart from the fact that their 
holdings of foreign exchange reserves would not have 
been adequate to mount a credible defence of the 
exchange rate. Speculators' anticipation that the 
Hong Kong dollar's peg could be relinquished was 
' The Hong Kong dollar has been pegged to the US dollar since 
1983, at a rate of US$1 = HK$ 7.80. 
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heightened by the stock market crash. However, 
despite the speculative attacks being made on other 
East Asian currencies the Hong Kong dollar emerged 
unscathed. It is of great importance to China that 
Hong Kong's currency-board system should remain in 
place, since the People's Republic has a vital interest 
in borrowing from abroad on favourable terms to 
finance further economic development, and the yuan 
is not yet properly convertibfe. 
The IMF's Support Activities in South-East Asia 
Most of the countries affected by the South-East 
Asian crisis, namely Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, were promised "bail-out" loan facilities 
following negotiations with the IMF. These had 
different credit ceilings and conditions attached, 
depending on the seriousness of their currency crises 
and the underlying state of their economies. 
Within the scope of the arrangements agreed with 
the IMF, support programmes were also offered by 
other countries, notably Japan, the USA and Euro- 
pean countries. The purpose behind these support 
efforts is to prevent countries susceptible to crisis 
from suffering a collapse in their balance of payments 
on a scale that could threaten the stability of neigh- 
bouring countries and indeed of the international 
financial system in general. 
In August 1997, Thailand was granted an aid 
package valued at $17.2 billion by the IMF and other 
lenders? The attached conditions for 1998 include a 
cut in government expenditure to allow a budget 
surplus to be achieved even as tax revenues fall. 
Another condition is that the Bank of Thailand should 
not allow its currency reserves to fall below a certain 
minimum (they currently stand at $ 24.8 billion), and 
yet another is that it must toughen up its lending 
criteria. The restrictive monetary policy now in place 
has already led to sharp increases in interest rates. 
On 31st October 1997, Indonesia was offered a 
support programme of $ 33 billion by the IMF and a 
number of countries? The promises made by the 
Indonesian government include that it would break up 
the country's industrial monopolies, rationalize the 
ailing banking system, ensure that foreign entities 
obtain easier access to local financial markets, loosen 
up the subsidies applied to certain goods, and reduce 
customs duties. Indonesia declared that it was pre- 
pared to close down and possibly liquidate 16 banks. 
The Philippines obtained one billion dollars' worth 
of IMF support to stabilize the peso. Malaysia, on the 
other hand, has not applied to the Fund for any credit 
assistance in spite of its high current account deficit, 
a substantial volume of foreign borrowing and a 
distressed property sector. 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan do not appear 
to have been so badly affected by the regional 
currency crisis. 
The aid packages laid on by the IMF, other 
institutions and governments have attracted a variety 
of criticisms. First of all, the considerable size of the 
bridging loans (totalling $100 billion for East Asia as 
a whole), exacerbate the problem of moral hazard. In 
a market system, private enterprises and government 
bodies ought to bear their own risks. That requires 
losses to be internalized, i.e. bankruptcies and all their 
ensuing consequences ought to be allowed to 
happen, thus increasing the pressure on everyone in 
the market to improve efficiency. If there is a general 
expectation that countries with currency problems will 
have an international safety-net held out for them, this 
sends out all the wrong signals and encourages 
parties to commit themselves to risky projects. It is 
probably no coincidence that, after credit lines were 
granted to the East Asian countries, the share price 
indices in Brazil and Argentina showed strong gains. 
The conditions laid down by the IMF are supposed 
to ensure that the countries affected will improve their 
economic situations. Yet many of the mistakes that 
have been made might possibly have been avoided if 
the institutions had stated from the outset that there 
would be "no bail out". 
Apart from changes in fundamental variables, 
destabilizing speculation can also play its part in 
generating international financial crises. In an uncer- 
tain currency environment, irrational forms of beha- 
viour such as the "herd instinct" or the "rush for the 
exit" may play a major part. That not only applies to 
foreign speculators but also to domestic firms and the 
public which may take flight into more stable 
currencies (e.g. the US dollar). 
B The credit line of $ 17.2 billion placed at Thailand's disposal 
consists of $ 3.9 billion contributed directly by the IMF, $ 4 billion by 
Japan, a total of $ 6 billion by a group comprising AustraIia, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Indonesia and South Korea, $1.5 
billion by the World Bank, and $1.2 billion by the Asian Development 
Elank. 
9 The $ 33-billion allocation was made available as follows: $ 10 
billion from the IMF, $ 4.5 billion from the World Bank, $ 3.5 billion 
from the Asian Development Bank, with second-line credit fac;lities 
from Japan ($ 5 billion), Singapore ($ 5 billion), the USA ($ 3 billion), 
Malaysia ($1 billion) and Australia ($ 1 billion). China may also join 
this group of supporting countries. 
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Globalization of Financial Markets 
The various stock exchanges and financial centres 
around the world are now very strongly interlinked and 
heavily interdependent. As financial markets have 
been deregulated and opened up to foreign investors, 
transaction costs have come down, new derivative 
financial instruments have been created, computer- 
aided trading systems have been developed and 
telecommunications technology has progressed, 
what used to be separate market segments have now 
merged into just one "world market". One of the 
results of this is that disruptions occurring in certain 
countries can rapidly spread to other regions without 
there necessarily being any causal relationship 
between the original disruption and the response 
elsewhere. This is underlined, for example, by the 
rapid knock-on effect seen to occur from the Hong 
Kong crash to other financial centres, though with 
varying degrees of intensity. The high mobility of 
capital has accelerated the speed at which turbulence 
on foreign exchange markets is transmitted onward 
internationally. 
The Spread of the Crisis to South Korea 
South Korea faces difficulties similar to those of 
South-East Asian countries despite its more 
advanced state of economic development. Over the 
past 30 years, the country's economy has achieved 
average annual real growth of 8.6%, and it now ranks 
eleventh in the world in terms of real GDP. South 
Korea is known for its major industrial conglomerates 
(the chaebol) operating in areas such as shipbuilding, 
automobiles, chemicals and semiconductors. For 
some years, however, South Korea has been in deficit 
on its current account, partly because its export 
volume fell back during the world recession while 
imports rose substantially (see Figure 2). 
As a strong flow of capital came in from abroad, 
Korean commercial banks had boosted their lending 
activity without paying sufficient attention to the credit 
standing of their debtors. The bulk of this lending 
went into unproductive areas, and transparency was 
impaired by the complex interlacing among chaebol, 
and by networks of informal relationships. A lot of 
Korean firms and banks took to borrowing in US 
dollars, to take advantage of lower interest rates. In 
anticipation of the repayments they would need to 
make on this dollar-denominated ebt, they began to 
step up the trading of Korean won for dollars once the 
won showed a weakening trend from November 1997 
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onwards. That only further increased the pressure on 
the won, which had depreciated by 35% against the 
dollar by mid-December (see Figure 3). Between late 
October and early December 1997, the Bank of 
Korea's convertible currency reserves fell from $ 30.5 
billion to $ 23.9 billion. The government made $17.9 
billion of these reserves available to commercial 
banks to allow them to repay their dollar-denominated 
debt, thus leaving just $ 6 billion in freely available 
reserves. 
IMF Bridging Loans for South Korea 
As it saw the level of foreign debt piling up (it now 
totals roughly $ 120 billion), the South Korean 
government ried to arrange loans from other central 
banks so that it could avoid the tough conditions 
imposed by the IMF, but it did not succeed because 
the country's credit standing was no longer adequate. 
After a number of negotiating rounds with the IMF, an 
agreement was signed on 3rd December 1997 in 
which South Korea was granted the largest credit line 
ever provided by the IMF, for a total of $ 57 billion over 
a three-year period, t~ 
The IMPs conditions as they apply to 1998 are: a 
10% cut in government expenditure, the restriction of 
GDP growth to a maximum of 2.5-3%, and the 
reduction of the current account deficit from $ 13 
billion to $ 5 billion. The organization also called for a 
dozen highly indebted Korean banks to be liquidated, 
and demanded greater transparency among the 
chaebol conglomerates, together with restructuring 
measures (including liquidations and also rationali- 
zation mergers). In particular, the chaebol were re- 
quired to cease providing guarantees for their sub- 
sidiary companies' debt. The ceiling on equity stakes 
in Korean firms held by foreign entities was also 
required to be raised from 26% to 59%. On top of 
these more detailed requirements, the IMF called for 
an increase in taxation, for the pursuit of a restrictive 
monetary policy which would substantially increase 
interest rates, and finally for greater labour-market 
flexibility. 
The rate of unemployment in South Korea was 
2.4% in December 1997, but approximately 1'/2 
million of the current workforce are thought likely to 
lose their jobs in the wake of the IMF agreement, 
which would push the unemployment rate up to 7% 
The contributions to the $ 57 billion credit package for South Korea 
were ae folrows: IMF, $ 21 billion; World Bank, $ 10 billion; Asian 
Development Bank, $ 4 billion; Japan, $10 billion; USA, $ 5 billion; 
Group of Ten, $ 7 billion. 
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during 1998. The prospect of this occurring has 
already given rise to extensive unrest and to strikes by 
trades unions. 
Despite the measures that had been instituted, the 
won continued its decline against the dollar, partly in 
anticipation of the dollar-denominated loan repay- 
ments which will fall due during 1998, and partly also 
because of fears that the commercial banking system 
and the chaebol could collapse altogether. Just a 
week after the IMF agreement, the won went into "free 
fall", losing 49% of its dollar value. The KOSP index 
also fell by approximately 20% in the same week, 
leaving it 50% lower on its June 1997 level (see Figure 
4). A 10% daily limit on the depreciation of the won 
soon proved counter-productive and was lifted again 
on 15th December 1997. South Korea's government 
then requested the IMF, Japan and the USA to speed 
up the bridging loan programme, to avoid a melt- 
down in the foreign exchange and stock markets. 
On 23rd December 1997, South Korea's president- 
elect, Kim Dae Jung, stated in an interview that the 
possibility of a debt-repayment moratorium could not 
be ruled out. That set the won plunging by another 
15%, and the KOSP index shed 7.8%. Seeing the 
persisting drain on confidence, the IMF and a group of 
countries felt it was necessary to speed up the pro- 
vision of financial assistance to South Korea, and $10 
billion in loan finance was released ahead of the 
scheduled date. Steps were also taken to roll over 
debt falling due. South Korea's parliament enacted 
reform legislation conforming to the IMF's conditions, 
which included independence for the central bank, 
tax increases, and measures to facilitate structural 
adjustment. That temporarily calmed the financial 
markets down. However, the value of the won 
continued on its downward path in early January 
1998, whereupon the government agreed to a 
toughening of the IMF's conditions, which now 
assumed real GDP growth in 1998 in the 1-2% range, 
along with a 5% inflation rate, a ceiling on money 
supply growth of 15%, and convertible currency 
reserves at an average level of $8.1 billion during the 
year. 
On 28th January 1998, the South Korean govern- 
ment and a group of international bankers came to an 
agreement on the rescheduling and restructuring of 
" The Morgan/Citicorp/Chase Plan proposed that the South Korean 
government should make new issues of government bonds worth 
$ 25 billion. $10 billion of the proceeds would have been retained in 
cash, and the remaining $ 15 billion used to convert Korean com- 
mercial bank debt. The bonds' terms to maturity would have ranged 
from one to 20 years. 
62 
dollar-denominated debt payable by the country's 
commercial banks. The plan is to replace short-term 
by slightly longer-term borrowing (with terms from one 
to three years). A proportion of the rescheduled debt 
obligations will be issued with a government 
guarantee. Once the rescheduling (planned on a 
voluntary basis) is complete, the plan is that South 
Korea should replenish its foreign currency reserves 
by issuing new government bonds. This agreement 
does not match the "Morgan/Citicorp/Chase" Plan, as 
the South Korean government was not prepared to 
issue public in place of private debt paper." 
Though foreign debt only amounts to 40% of the 
country's GDP, the domestic debt burden totals 180% 
of GDP. At least 20% of the domestic debts are now 
irrecoverable, so there is a serious danger of banks 
collapsing due to insufficient liquidity. Consequently, if 
the other measures already taken do not bear fruit 
(scaling down and/or takeovers in the banking sector), 
the Bank of Korea will have to inject liquidity as the 
lender of last resort. 
The Korean crisis also had a telling influence on the 
foreign exchange and financial markets in South-East 
Asia. Between mid-1997 and the end of January 
1998, the rupiah depreciated by 80% against the 
dollar, while the won, baht and ringgit fell between 
45% and 55%. On one day alone, 8th January 1998, 
the rupiah collapsed by no less than 30%. In Figure 3 
the exchange rates of East Asian countries are only 
depicted up to December 1997, since the subsequent 
devaluations of the rupiah would have dwarfed the 
other exchange rates. The financial markets began to 
recover in early February, but heightened uncertainty 
has been reflected in considerable market volatility. 
indonesia has been considering establishing a cur- 
rency board in order to restore confidence in the 
rupiah. However, a change to this kind of foreign- 
exchange regime would not be credible and this, in 
the IMF's view, would have the opposite effect to what 
is desired. 
Assessment of the East Asian Crisis 
In spring 1997, the crisis started out in Thailand 
before spreading to other South-East Asian countries 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Singapore and Hong Kong were also hit, but the two 
city states' currencies have proven relatively robust. 
Then in autumn 1997, South Korea was also shaken 
by a serious currency and economic crisis. 
In these countries whose economies had been 
growing rapidly for many years, various problems 
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were manifested that were of their own making, such 
as increasing current account deficits, property crises, 
high levels of short-term foreign debt, rapid expansion 
of domestic credit, a lack of efficient risk manage- 
ment, and inadequate supervision of commercial 
banks. During long periods of economic growth, capi- 
tal inflows from abroad are necessary to meet the high 
funding needs for industrial development while 
savings levels, for the time being, remain low. Despite 
increasing exports, the countries concerned never- 
theless developed current account deficits due to 
high demand for imported capital goods and the need 
to service foreign debt, and the deficits were covered 
by net imports of capital. The fact that the countries' 
currencies were pegged to the dollar boosted the 
confidence of foreign investors. The large inflows of 
foreign exchange led to an increase in domestic 
money supply and kept interest rates down. Banks 
strongly increased their lending activity, most of which 
was concentrated in "non-productive" areas such as 
the property market. Because they did not practice 
adequate risk management, they allowed "bad" loans 
to pile up, and when demand unaccustomedly fell 
back many business ventures became insolvent and 
large numbers of jobs were lost. 
A significant underlying reason for the East Asian 
crisis is the "moral hazard" effect. The structure of 
these countries' economies involves an intricate 
network of cross shareholdings and personal con- 
tacts. A lot of firms had undertaken unduly high risks, 
in the hope that the state would back them if they 
faced the threat of bankruptcy (implicit government 
guarantee). Under these circumstances, firms were 
able to pocket the profits they earned on risky ven- 
tures, while saddling the general public with any 
substantial losses they incurred. This "risk asym- 
metry" brought with it the danger of a systemic crisis 
as greater and greater risks were taken. On the next 
level up, both governments and large companies in 
the East Asian economies assumed that international 
organizations, particularly the IMF and World Bank, 
would be quick to "bail them out" with bridging loans 
as they already had done in Mexico's case. That 
raised the willingness to accept risks far beyond the 
optimum level. 
Implicit government guarantees and international 
aid programmes distort risk patterns, and ought 
therefore to be implemented with great restraint, to 
keep moral hazard as low as possible. 
,2 Cf.,e.g., M. Haq,  I. Kaul ,  I. Grunberg :  The Tobin Tax, New 
York 1996. 
The tremendous loss of confidence in East Asian 
countries generated turbulence on the foreign ex- 
changes and pushed up their interest rates strongly. 
Speculation against their domestic currencies was 
further fuelled as their own nationals with dollar- 
denominated debts took flight in hard currencies. 
To stave off the threat of whole economies collap- 
sing, or at least of debt moratoria being declared, the 
IMF and creditor nations offered support in the shape 
of new loans. Foreign bank consortia offered firms in 
these countries debt-rescheduling packages, allowing 
them to transform short-term into longer-term obli- 
gations. 
It is only natural that the western industrial nations 
and Japan have an interest in halting East Asia's 
economic slide, as their own exports to the region 
play a significant part in securing jobs for the long 
haul. On the other hand, the huge devaluations of 
East Asian currencies pose a threat to the western 
industrial countries' competitiveness. 
The assistance provided by the IMF had the usual 
kind of conditions attached to ensure that financial 
structures in the countries concerned were reor- 
ganized. Choking back economic growth, while 
forcing domestic industrial groups to divest some of 
their interests in one another and to rationalize, will 
lead to some marked increases in unemployment. 
And although the danger of the East Asian crisis 
worsening still further now appears to have been 
banished for the time being, the financial markets 
remain highly volatile. 
Globalization means that different economies are 
increasingly interdependent, allowing disruptions to 
be quickly transmitted from one place to another. The 
only way of mitigating the tendency towards instability 
is to set up multilateral agreements applying appro- 
priate conditions, particularly to financial markets. 
Alongside fundamental imbalances, a large amount of 
destabilizing speculation is also in evidence on the 
foreign exchanges, taking irrational forms such as the 
herd instinct and self-fulfilling prophecies. Not only 
does the overall economic community need to look at 
ways of improving risk management (in respect of 
both credit and market risks), but it should also 
examine the pros and cons of introducing a "Tobin 
tax" on foreign exchange transactions. '~ Naturally, at 
the end of the day, whatever sensible precautions are 
taken at both national and international evels to limit 
the occurrence of financial and currency crises, it will 
never be possible to totally rule them out, simply 
because of human nature being what it is. 
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